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Avant-propos 
 
La réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) est aujourd’hui un concept central, 
que la communauté internationale s’efforce de développer afin d’encourager sa 
mise en œuvre. Il se fonde sur la nécessité d'une approche cohérente pour 
promouvoir stabilité et développement dans des pays aux structures étatiques 
fragiles, voire défaillantes. 
 
L’Union européenne a indiqué à de nombreuses reprises son souhait de 
promouvoir ce concept, notamment en Afrique. Cet engagement s’est concrétisé 
par le déploiement, au titre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, 
de trois missions de réforme du secteur de la sécurité – EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC RD 
Congo et UE RSS Guinée-Bissau – en complément des efforts de la Commission 
européenne pour soutenir les processus de réforme dans ces pays. 
 
Les résultats obtenus par l’Union européenne et ses Etats membres en ce 
domaine sont cependant limités. Certes, et parce qu'ils sont structurellement peu 
stables, les pays bénéficiaires ne sont pas toujours en mesure de conduire les 
processus politiques, juridiques et administratifs, voire constitutionnels, nécessaires 
pour réformer l'armée, la police, la justice. Mais, sur ces projets de long terme, la 
volonté et la capacité de l'Europe à mettre en place dans la durée les moyens 
nécessaires, humains et financiers, restent également à démontrer. La délimitation 
des champs d'intervention respectifs de la politique européenne de sécurité et de 
défense et de la Communauté européenne, avec les actions menées par la 
Commission, demanderait parfois à être mieux pensée et mieux précisée. 
 
Alors que l'on sait bien qu'il faut soutenir aujourd'hui les processus de réforme 
pour éviter les conflits de demain, l’Union européenne doit accroître et organiser ses 
capacités d'action. La présidence française du second semestre 2008 a ainsi pris les 
dispositions nécessaires pour que l'Union européenne dispose à brève échéance de 
meilleures compétences, avec l'identification systématique d'experts en matière de 
réforme du secteur de sécurité. 
 
Le travail d'analyse et de réflexion mené par Quentin Weiler décrit les lacunes 
de l’approche européenne et le chemin à parcourir pour que l’Union puisse 
s'affirmer comme un acteur crédible. Il est à ce titre fort utile et bienvenu. 
 
Christine Roger 
Ambassadeur et représentant de la 
France auprès du Comité Politique et 
de Sécurité de l’Union européenne 
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Abstract1 
 
The nature of security challenges in Africa being inextricably linked with a 
deficient security sector, Security Sector Reform (SSR) emerged as a relevant 
concept to address security and governance issues at the same time. In this context, 
the European Union (EU) emphasised in its discourse the need to reinforce the link 
between security and development to meet the objectives of peace, security and 
stability in Africa. Compared to states and international organisations, the EU can be 
considered a priori as a leader in the field of SSR. First, it has a wide range of policy 
instruments at its disposal covering the whole spectrum of SSR (army, police, justice, 
good governance). Second, the EU sustains a ‘post-modern’ approach based on 
security through transparency and interdependence, which allows it to overcome 
the traditional bilateral state relations.  
In view of this comparative advantage in theory, the main question addressed 
in this paper is whether the EU actually is a leader in practice in promoting SSR in 
Africa through a coherent use of its policy instruments. A close analysis of the EU’s 
engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Guinea-Bissau will reveal 
numerous impediments, regarding inter- and intra-pillar coordination as well as a 
lack of political commitment, preventing the EU from dealing comprehensively with 
SSR. The EU’s approach is also constrained by the fact that enforcing a ‘post-
modern’ rationale in ‘pre-modern’ states is perilous when the recipient state is 
unstable or unwilling to implement a reform process.  
Hence, the EU is still a laggard or an actor ‘in the making’ in the field of SSR. It 
lacks greater coherence and consistency between its policy instruments, mainly 
because of its fragmented pillar system based on separate competences between 
the Community (first pillar) and the Council (second pillar) which created a gap 
between a development and a security-oriented community. It also needs stronger 
political commitment from the Member States in order to operationalise the SSR 
concept, notably by supporting more intensively EU SSR missions in Africa. Overall, 
the EU needs to elaborate one strategic vision (something that the Lisbon Treaty, if 
ever ratified, could contribute to achieve) in order to overcome its theoretical, 
institutional and political obstacles.  
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Professor Cesira D’Aniello, Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson and Dr. Bruno 
Scholl for their valuable suggestions.  
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1.  Introduction: the EU and Security Sector Reform 
 
“They who would give up an essential liberty for  
temporary security, deserve neither liberty nor security.” 
Benjamin Franklin 
 
The promotion of peace, security and stability is listed as the first priority of the 
‘Joint EU-Africa Strategy’ adopted at the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit in 2007.2 It recalls 
the wider EU policy towards Africa aiming at fostering economic development and 
empowering local authorities with the necessary capabilities to ensure security and 
promote good governance. This dual objective is in line with the new dominant 
paradigm within the international community based on the assumption that there is 
‘no development without security’ and vice versa. This theory derives from the 
resurgence of internal conflicts after the end of the Cold War that proved the 
necessity to redefine development and security policies.3 African states were 
particularly affected by such conflicts that undermined governments’ capacity to 
absorb development aid and exploit it to increase stability and prosperity. 
Conversely, political instability triggered a lack of differentiation between internal 
and external threats and distorted the division of roles between security forces.4 The 
army was frequently used to protect ruling regimes and carried out traditional police 
work, thereby weakening the legitimacy of governments and fostering the 
emergence of so-called ‘failed states’. 
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  S e c u r i t y  S e c t o r  R e f o r m  e m e r g e d  a s  a  r e l e v a n t  c o n c e p t  
addressing the core deficiencies of a state with the aim of improving not only ‘state 
security’ but in a wider sense ‘human security’, that is to say the security of every 
single human being within the society. This concept was first publicly elaborated in 
1998 by Clare Short, the then British Development Cooperation Minister, who 
described the purpose of SSR as to “ensure the efficient and effective provision of 
state and human security within a framework of democratic governance”.5 The 
concept rests on the assumption that development and security actors of the 
international community could gain from cooperating with one another in order to 
                                                 
2 ‘The Africa-EU strategic partnership, a Joint EU Strategy’, Lisbon, December 2007. 
3 S. Jean, ‘Security Sector Reform and Development: An African Perspective’, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2005, p. 3.  
4 N. Ngoma, ‘The Myths and Realities of Civil-Military Relations in Africa and the Search for 
Peace and Development’, Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2006, p. 14. 
5 H. Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising Security Sector Reform’, in A. Bryden & H. Hänggi (eds.), Reform 
and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Münster, Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 2. 
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attain common objectives, particularly in post-conflict situations.6 As stated by Ann 
Fitz-Gerald, SSR is “the new policy area that unites security and development in post-
conflict states”.7 The very nature of SSR is broad as it encompasses not only 
disarmament and restructuring of the army, but also reform of the police and the 
justice sector as well as democratic oversight over the whole security apparatus.8 
Accordingly, international donors face a major challenge in the implementation of 
this concept given that it requires the mobilisation of various resources to support all 
aspects of the reform process.9 Whether for an individual state or for an international 
organisation, it entails a high degree of coordination between competent ministries, 
departments, agencies or institutions. This objective is defined as the need to sustain 
a ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘whole-of-organisation’ approach.10  
Numerous national and international actors identified SSR as a new priority 
high on their agenda, like the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The reasons to consider 
the European Union as a leader to address the issue of SSR in Africa are twofold. First, 
the EU is able to mobilise resources from a large array of fields covering the whole 
spectrum of SSR (army, police, justice, good governance…) through the external 
relations’ competences of the Community (first pillar), the crisis management 
operations launched in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP, second pillar) and the external aspects of the Justice and Home Affairs 
policies (third pillar). In view of this ‘pillar structure’ characterised by different 
decision-making procedures, the key challenge for the EU hinges on its capacity to 
sustain a comprehensive approach between these policy instruments. Second, the 
EU embraced a ‘post-modernism’ outlook by sustaining a security discourse based 
on the willingness to foster development and ultimately to promote peace outside of 
its territory. According to Robert Cooper,11 whereas ‘modern’ states are built upon a 
strict separation between domestic and foreign affairs, ‘post-modern’ actors 
transcend the traditional notion of nation-state to promote a world order “governed 
                                                 
6 P. Doelle & A. Gouzée de Harven, ‘Security Sector Reform: a Challenging Concept at the 
Nexus between Security and Development’, in D. Spence & P. Fluri (eds.), The European Union 
and Security Sector Reform, Geneva, John Harper Publishing, 2008, p. 39. 
7 A. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Addressing the Security-Development Nexus’, Policy Matters, Vol. 5, No. 5, 
2004, p. 3. 
8 A. Schnabel & H.-G. Ehrhart (eds.), ‘Security Sector Reform and Post-conflict Peace-
building’, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005, p. 3. 
9 J. Chanaa, ‘SSR: Issues, Challenges and Prospects’, Adelphi Paper, No. 344, London, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p. 12. 
10 D. Law (ed.), Intergovernmental Approaches to Security Sector Reform, Geneva, Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006, p. 1. 
11 R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London, 
Atlantic Books, 2003, pp. 16-54. 
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by law rather than force”,12 including by interfering into another state’s domestic 
affairs if admitted by the recipient state.13 The EU has long ago given up the recourse 
to violence as a means to solve conflicts and henceforth promotes SSR as an 
alternative to ensure both ‘state security’ and ‘human security’. In this regard, while 
ex-colonial powers maintain close relations with their former colonies in Africa, the 
past may remain an obstacle for further involvement of a state into the very 
foundations of another. Therefore, one can consider the EU as a legitimate actor to 
transcend this dilemma as its post-modern approach is based on “security through 
transparency and transparency through interdependence”.14 The EU endorses a very 
broad understanding of SSR and is able to impact on the reform of security systems in 
a comprehensive way, through instruments from the development and the security 
fields. Moreover, as opposed to ‘modernism’ which is still attached to the security of 
the state,15 the EU proves itself ‘post-modern’ by placing the security of individuals at 
the core of its values by focusing on the reform of the whole security sector, including 
oversight bodies.  
Thus, the range of policy instruments at the disposal of the EU represents a so-
called comparative advantage in the field of SSR compared to other international 
organisations, at least in theory. In practice, does the EU manage to overcome its 
institutional fragmentation, its theoretical differences between a ‘development’ and 
a ‘security-oriented’ community and its political diversity to promote a coherent 
approach? Is the EU’s ‘post-modern’ rationale relevant in so-called ‘pre-modern’ 
states in Africa where the alternative is between “empires and chaos”?16 
The first section of this paper seeks to define SSR in order to identify its structural 
purposes. The second section will examine the EU’s progressive assimilation of the 
concept, on the basis of a fragmented approach. The third section will assess the 
impact of the EU’s engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in 
Guinea-Bissau and point out its limits. Finally, the fourth section will identify the 
institutional, theoretical, and political impediments preventing the EU from sustaining 
a comprehensive approach in the field of SSR.  
 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 31. 
13 S. Van Damme, ‘The European Union as a Post-modern Security Actor? Defence Reform in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Natolin, College of Europe, Master's thesis, 2007, p. 2. 
14 Cooper, op.cit., p. 37. 
15 Ibid., p. 53. 
16 Ibid., p. 17. 
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2.  Security Sector Reform: a Broad Concept  
 
The emergence of the SSR concept responds to the increasing necessity to 
incorporate prevailing security actors within the scope of reconstruction processes, 
as they might be a part of the problem but obviously a part of the solution as well.17 
The main objective is to restore armed forces under civilian control, a goal often 
referred as the road to ‘civil supremacy’. However, the fact that SSR is at the 
crossroads of two divisive notions, the civil-military relations and the security-
development nexus, renders it difficult to capture its essence in a single definition.18  
 
2.1  Definition and Objectives  
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) undertook a crucial work of 
conceptualisation in order to set out the general principles of SSR in its ‘Guidelines on 
Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice’. The document 
is considered as a reference for SSR practitioners, and the EU largely used it to spell 
out its own understanding. According to the DAC, 
 
SSR aims at transforming the security system, which includes all the actors, their 
roles, responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the 
system, in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles 
of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning security 
framework.19  
This definition implies an enlargement of the notion of ‘security sector’ to the 
‘governance field’ and incorporates subsequent steps: demobilisation, disarmament 
and reintegration (DDR) of former warring factions, control of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW), practical management of the reduction of the military sector, 
reform of the police, reform of the judiciary system and democratic governance 
over armed forces. Unlike the SSR concept that was formulated for the first time in 
1998, such notions were not considered new in the security literature.20 What 
constitutes the innovation of SSR is rather the assembling of all these elements within 
a single policy concept.  
                                                 
17 N. Ball, ‘Dilemmas of Security Sector’, in C. McCartney (eds.), SSR: Potential and Challenges 
for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series, No. 2, Berlin, 2003, p. 47 
18 D. Chuter, ‘Understanding Security Sector Reform’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006, p. 3. 
19 OECD, ‘Security Sector Reform and Governance Policy: Policy and Good Practice’, Policy 
Brief, Paris, OECD, May 2004, p. 11.  
20 M. Brzoska, ‘Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform’, Occasional 
Paper, No. 4, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003, 
p. 7. 
  8 Quentin Weiler 
A s  s u c h ,  t h e  S S R  c o n c e p t  i s  o f  a  p u r e l y  ‘ m o d e r n ’  t r a d i t i o n  a s  i t  a i m s  a t  
empowering the state with the necessary capabilities to control what Weber 
depicted as the legitimate monopoly of the use of force.21 Yet, it encapsulates a 
‘post-modern’ influence as SSR does not only focus on state institutions, such as the 
army or the police, but also on the oversight bodies and civil society in order to 
diffuse the control over the security system. In this regard, the different policy goals of 
SSR aim at reforming the institutional, economical, social and political aspects of a 
state in a progressive manner.22 This distinction is partly explained by the different 
nature of the international donors, whether they are international organisations or 
individual states, as their involvement depends on competences and/or resources at 
their disposal. It also highlights the fact that SSR requires the adoption of a ‘holistic 
approach’ in order to be successful. Addressing only one aspect of the security 
sector would be deemed as ineffective: for instance, an operational police needs a 
proficient judicial system able to enforce appropriate sanctions.  
 
2.2  Structural Difficulties Inherent to the Concept 
In view of the interdependence of the different components of the security 
sector, the definition of a political action plan is essential to set out the successive 
steps of the reform process and points out its possible outcomes. It facilitates the 
mobilisation of national stakeholders towards the achievement of common 
objectives and allows third actors, in accordance with local authorities, to target the 
critical areas in which assistance might be required. Political willingness of the 
recipient state is then the key for supporting SSR projects. For instance, SSR in Sierra 
Leone is considered as a success because of the thorough work undertaken by local 
authorities to define an action plan, in association with civil society, which allowed 
main donors, such as the United Kingdom, to adequately support the process.23 
All the more, SSR is a highly sensitive political process since it “affects the very 
foundations upon which political power resides”.24 The respect for ‘local ownership’ is 
an indispensable element of SSR as it is crucial that reforms are not imposed by 
international actors but designed and implemented by local authorities. Otherwise, 
international donors face the issue of a lack of legitimacy when offering assistance to 
                                                 
21 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York, Free Press, 1964. 
22 H. Wulf, ‘RSS dans les pays en développement et les pays en transition’, Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Washington, D.C., 2005, p. 2. 
23 O. Gbla, ‘Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone’, in Le Rouy, Len & Kidane, Yemane (eds.), 
Challenges to Security Sector Reform in the Horn of Africa, Monograph no. 135, Pretoria, 
Institute for Security Studies, May 2007, pp. 13-36. 
24 UNDP, Justice and Security Sector Reform: BCPR’s Programmatic Approach, New York, 
2002, p. 17. 
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third states as it could give the impression to impose a reform based on Western 
schemes, without appreciation of the local situation. As stated earlier, one can 
consider the EU as a credible actor to surmount this impediment that former colonial 
powers might encounter. Indeed, traditional bilateral talks between states tend to 
underline the very modern condition of their relations (i.e. Belgium and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) whereas the EU is in a position to transcend this 
dilemma. It is build upon a transnational and competence-shared system which 
surpasses the traditional notion of power between states to promote the ultimate 
objective of peace and stability. Hence, the EU’s external polices are based on 
cooperation rather than power or even coercion (e.g. President Kabila sent to the 
Secretary General/High Representative, Javier Solana, an official letter inviting the EU 
to assist the DRC in the defence sector25). 
 
3.  EU’s Conception of SSR: a Fragmented Approach 
 
The EU puts in its discourse a strong emphasis on the need to promote conflict 
prevention and it has built up its own security identity on this very assumption. Yet, 
the recognition of the link between security and development was not immediately 
translated into policy actions.26 In other words, a ‘cultural revolution’ was necessary 
to make the EU enforce the concept of SSR, a process often referred to as the 
‘radicalisation of development’ and the ‘securitisation of underdevelopment’.27 
 
3.1  SSR in the First Pillar: Development and Conflict Prevention 
In its communication ‘The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: 
Peace-Building Conflict Prevention and Beyond’ of 1996, the European Commission 
emphasised the “key role played by development in the prevention and regulation 
of African conflicts”.28 Yet, the Commission encountered difficulties to immediately 
turn this policy shift into concrete actions to such an extent that a thorough debate 
emerged on the effectiveness of European development programmes. The 
Commission contribution was contested on the basis of a lack of strategic outlook, 
“as strategies tended to be guided by instruments rather than by policy objectives 
                                                 
25 Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005, p. 1. 
26 C .  S a n t i s o ,  ‘ T h e  R e f o r m  o f  E U  D e v e l o p m e n t  P o l i c y ’ ,  CEPS Working Document, No. 182, 
Brussels, March 2002, p. 3. 
27 D. Buzeman, ‘The Importance of Concepts in the EU Security-Development Nexus’, Bruges, 
College of Europe, Master's thesis, 2007, p. 27. 
28 N. Bagoyoko & M. Gibert, ‘The European Union in Africa’, Institute of Development Studies, 
May 2007, p. 13. 
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and political dialogue”.29 Following the impetus given in 2000 by the then 
Commission President Romano Prodi to streamline the external relations’ framework, 
a redefinition of policy objectives was put forward to include security and conflict 
prevention issues on the Commission’s development agenda.30 The ‘Communication 
on Conflict Prevention’ of 2001,31 the ‘Communication on Governance and 
Development’ of 200332 and the ‘European Consensus on Development’ of 2005 
sanctioned this major shift.33 Subsequently, both DG Development (DG Dev) and DG 
External Relations (DG Relex) concretised the need to face development challenges 
with a security perspective. On the one hand, DG Dev put conflict prevention on its 
agenda and endorsed the notion of ‘human security’ as a concept of reference.34 
On the other hand, DG Relex created in 2001 a ‘Conflict and Peace-Building Unit’ in 
charge of coordinating the Commission efforts in conflict prevention.35  
These policy adjustments witness the progressive connection with the concept 
of SSR. Currently, the Commission supports SSR-related projects in more than 35 Sub-
Saharan countries through a combination of short- and long-term instruments:  
-  the European Development Fund (EDF), endowed with a budget of €22,682 
million in the 10th EDF (2008-2013), provides development aid to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The lengthy procedures and the 
difficulties to precisely target the needs of the recipient state do not make it 
the most functional instrument to support SSR projects though;36    
-  the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  (EIDHR), 
endowed with a budget of €1,104 million (2007-2013), aims at “promot[ing] 
effective and transparent democratic accountability and oversight, 
including that of the security and justice sectors”;37  
                                                 
29 Santiso, op.cit., p. 6. 
30 Ibid. 
31 European Commission, Communication from the Commission  on Conflict Prevention, 
COM(2001) 211, Brussels, 11 April 2001. 
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Governance and 
Development, COM(2003) 615, Brussels, 20 October 2003. 
33  Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 
the development policy of the European Union entitled ‘The European Consensus’, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 46, 24 February 2006. 
34 S. Duke, ‘The Institutional and Financial Dimensions of Conflict Prevention’, in V. Kronenberg 
& J. Wouters (eds.), The European Union and Conflict Prevention: Policy and Legal Aspects, 
The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2004, p. 120. 
35 J. Nino-Perez, ‘EU Instruments for Conflict Prevention’, in Kronenberg & Wouters, op.cit., p. 7. 
36 F. Faria & P. Magalhães, ‘Situation of Fragility: Challenges for a European Response 
Strategy’, ECDPM, Maastricht, December 2007, p. 93. 
37 Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 
December 2006. 
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-  the Instrument for Stability (IfS), endowed with a budget of €2,062 million 
(2007-2013), is the main Commission instrument to support SSR projects in third 
states because of its technical flexibility and its complementary to long-term 
instruments. It derives from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism created in 2001 
after the Relex Commissioner Chris Pattern identified the need “to be quick 
and effective” when getting involved in conflict prevention activities.38 Its 
main asset is to provide the Commission with an instrument immediately 
available to respond to a crisis, up to a period of eighteen months, without 
going through the long process of Member States’ scrutiny over Commission 
activities (i.e., the comitology process);  
-  the political dialogue, introduced by the Cotonou Agreement, offers the EU 
the opportunity to underline policy concerns, such as excessive military 
expenditures, that ACP states should take into account to meet the 
objectives of development and democratic governance.39 The new 
emphasis put on ‘human security’ thus encouraged the Commission not only 
to offer technical assistance but also to target governance aspects of SSR.40  
 
As a result, the diversity of Commission instruments and the relative slowness of 
the decision-making process certainly make it more complex to sustain a 
comprehensive policy approach towards SSR. The general goal is to contribute to 
SSR but it remains an unidentified priority within these policy instruments.41  
 
3.2  SSR in the Second Pillar: Civil-Military Relations 
In the meantime, conflict prevention was steadily incorporated in the 
objectives of the EU as the adoption of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ in 1992 and their 
inclusion into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 illustrate.42 The development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) offered the operational framework to 
translate the ambition of an ever-growing involvement in crisis management, of 
                                                 
38 C. Pattern, quoted in R. Rummel, ‘The EU’s Involvement in Conflict Prevention: Strategy and 
Practice’, in Kronenberger & Wouters, op.cit., p. 81. 
39 D. Law & O. Myshlovska, ‘The Evolution of the Concepts of Security Sector Reform and 
Security Sector Governance: the EU Perspective’, in Spence & Fluri, op.cit., p. 17. 
40 C. Gourlay, ‘The Difficulties of a Donor: EU Financial Instruments, SSR and Effective 
International Assistance’, in Spence & Fluri, op.cit., p. 83. 
41 Ibid., p. 102. 
42 Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU): ‘the Petersberg tasks cover the 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, the peace-keeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peacemaking’. 
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which SSR became an important element as reflected in the ‘EU Programme for the 
Prevention of Violent Conflict’ issued by the European Council in 2001.43 
To this aim, civilian and military capabilities programmes have been 
undertaken to provide the necessary means to achieve these objectives. For 
instance, the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal address the reinforcement of civilian 
capabilities with a view to providing the EU with a pool of experts in the area of 
police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection as well as in the SSR and 
DDR field.44 Concomitantly, a development of the structures in charge of conducting 
ESDP operations took place. First, a growing need to integrate civil-military 
coordination triggered the creation of a civil-military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) within the EU 
Military Staff, aiming at achieving greater coherence in the planning phase.45 
Second, Member States decided to create a Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC) in 2006, a ‘civilian Brussels-based headquarters’, to improve and 
professionalise the planning and conduct of civilian operations. 
Overall, the EU has launched twenty-two crisis management operations since 
2003, of those nine took place in Africa, covering a large spectrum of areas, either 
sub-sectorial (police reform, border management) or comprehensive (SSR in 
general). The main difference in the Council’s and Commission’s contribution to SSR 
is in the nature of the engagement, as ESDP operations are more visible and aim at 
achieving results in the short term.  
 
3.3  Comparing the Two EU SSR Concepts  
As a key policy concept at the core of conflict prevention theory, SSR was 
introduced on the EU’s foreign policy agenda.46 Nevertheless, while looking at the 
EU’s possible contribution to SSR, the need to sustain a coherent approach between 
all available instruments was inevitably identified as a priority. According to Javier 
Solana, “for sustainable ESDP missions, civil and military initiatives need to be better 
linked to the EU’s longer term conflict prevention and development programmes 
                                                 
43 European Council, ‘EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’, Göteborg 
Programme, June 2001, p. 4: the “administration of justice, improving police services, and 
human rights training for the whole security sector” are identified “as a means of contribution 
to conflict prevention”.  
44 A. Nowak, ‘Civilian Crisis Management within ESDP’, in A. Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis 
Management: the EU Way, Chaillot Paper, No. 90, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, June 
2006, p. 17. 
45 S. Pullinger (ed.), ‘Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination’, Joint Report by ISIS Europe 
and CMSS, Brussels, ISIS Europe, 2006, p. 6. 
46 See ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 
2003, p. 6.  
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and vice-versa”,47 an imperative reflected in the European Security Strategy. 
Likewise, the Commission Communication on ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ of 
2005 stated that “non-development policies should respect development policy 
objectives and development cooperation should, where possible, also contribute to 
reaching the objectives of other EU policies”.48 It illustrates the EU’s evolution towards 
the ‘radicalisation of development’ and the ‘securitisation of underdevelopment’. 
However, both the Council and the Commission issued framework concepts 
to set out their policy objectives for SSR: a ‘Concept for ESDP Support to SSR’ by the 
Council in 200549 and a ‘Concept for European Community Support for SSR’ by the 
Commission in 2006.50 The fact that two concepts were articulated reflects the 
nature of the EU itself, based on a wide range of resources, but built upon a pillar 
system with distinct competences.51 Situated at the margins of the development and 
security realms, the SSR concept highlights the difficulties to draw the line between 
first- and second-pillar competences. The drafting of only one EU SSR concept would 
have implied a thorough inter-institutional debate to precisely determine who is 
doing what in areas in which both institutions claim to be competent. The calls to 
merge the two concepts have been increasingly pressing though and the Council 
eventually adopted conclusions in June 200652 bringing them together “under an 
overall EU policy framework”.53 The November 2007 Council Conclusions on the 
security-development nexus also pointed out the need to sustain a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach and identified ways to improve coordination in a specific 
section on SSR.54 Yet, it embodies more political signals than practical steps forward 
since it does not replace the two concepts by one EU common approach and does 
not define SSR implementation guidelines reflecting the specificities of the EU. 
At first, the difference between the two SSR concepts  seems to be solely 
“functional”55 as the Commission can only carry out civilian activities while the 
Council is able to act both on civilian and military aspects. The reasons why the 
                                                 
47 ‘Contribution by the Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana to the EU 
Strategy for Africa’, 21 November 2005, Council Doc. S377/05. 
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49 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform 
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51 Law & Myshlovska, op.cit., p. 4. 
52 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security 
Sector Reform’, Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.  
53 Law & Myshlovska, p. 6. 
54 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on Security and Development’, 
Brussels, 12 November 2007.  
55 Law & Myshlovska, op.cit. 
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Commission is not entitled to tackle defence reform activities are twofold: first, it falls 
outside the Official Development Assistance eligibility which delimits the scope of 
areas that can be financed through development aid;56 second, article 28(3) TEU 
forbids the Community budget to finance any kind of military operation or activities 
having defence implications. Thus, although both documents actually emphasise the 
need to ensure coordination, the fact that two concepts were drafted demonstrates 
a deeper cultural gap as well as different approaches in the very conception of 
security.  
The two concepts are very similar in the broad definition of SSR put forward 
and they capture the aspiration to ultimately protect the individual by promoting a 
security system based on good governance. Yet, whereas the two concepts refer to 
security as including ‘human and governance security’, the Commission mentions 
‘human security’ first and ‘governance security’ second, illustrating the increasing 
focus on “individuals’ physical security [and] the protection of their rights”.57 
Conversely, the Council document refers first to ‘governance security’ before 
‘human security’  (“state stability” before “safety and well-being of their people”), 
thereby stressing the ‘security of the state’. Thus, the Commission document tends to 
be ‘governance-oriented’, whereas the Council document is more ‘security-
oriented’.58 The very fact that the Commission actually uses the broader term 
‘security system’ rather than the narrower ‘security sector’ illustrates its efforts to also 
target oversight bodies and civil society within the scope of reform processes.59  
The emphasis here is not merely rhetorical but intends to point out the 
dialectic between security and development in the EU SSR concepts that partly 
explains the inter-institutional problems to coordinate activities in the field. This 
distinction underlines that the Commission has a far-reaching approach, centred on 
good governance and human rights, whereas the Council is “more operationally 
driven, with an immediate interest for stabilization”,60 focusing on the security of the 
state by providing assistance to re-organise the bulk of the security forces. The fact 
that the two approaches put together offer the EU the capacity to act on the entire 
spectrum of SSR indicates that they are far from being incompatible. However, they 
have somehow been perceived as competitive, especially with the increasing 
                                                 
56 Doelle & Gouzée de Harven, op.cit., p. 63. 
57 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Security Sector Reform in the Congo’, op.cit., p. 7. 
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visibility of ESDP operations.61 Thus, if the absence of an overarching SSR framework 
within the EU is not considered as “the main problem”, the two concepts actually 
illustrate “how different we are”62 and how difficult it is to tackle the issue of 
fragmentation of competences.  
 
4.  The EU’s Engagement in SSR Projects in Africa: from Theory to Reality  
 
4.1  Democratic Republic of Congo, the First Comprehensive EU Engagement  
After a succession of regional and internal wars, the DRC is a prime example 
of the strong necessity to reform the security apparatus in order to achieve political 
stabilisation and foster economic development. The international community has 
been involved in numerous projects or operations to support the government, in 
particular the United Nations through the MONUC operation involving 18,000 troops. 
The EU has also been significantly engaged in the DRC on the basis of a wide range 
of instruments and launched SSR projects in three specific strands of the security 
sector: defence, police and justice.  
First, the EU’s involvement in the defence reform attempted to take into 
account the overall reform of the army on the basis of the National Strategic Plan for 
the Integration of Armed Forces, adopted by the Congolese Government in 2005.63 
On the one hand, the Commission committed €20 million to the Multi-Country 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme of Central Africa. It aimed at 
demobilising and disarming 150,000 identified ex-combatants and providing them 
with an orientation seminar in order to facilitate either their integration within the 
Congolese Army into newly created brigades (i.e. the ‘brassage process’) or their 
reintegration into the society.64 The Commission also supported the efforts of the 
‘EUSEC DRC’ mission through the financing of assisting measures, the so-called 
‘flanking measures’, to build up infrastructures for the ‘brassage’ process, like training 
centres, or to target the families of the soldiers, for example by improving access to 
water.65 On the other hand, the Council brought expertise to the Congolese 
administration through its first SSR-driven mission ‘EUSEC DRC’, comprising 59 
personnel. The mission was launched in June 2005, at the request of the Congolese 
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62 Interview with an official of the European Commission, DG Relex. 
63 ICG, ‘SSR in the Congo’, Crisis Group Africa Report, No. 104, 13 February 2006, p. 17. 
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government, to provide “advice and assistance for security sector reform in the DRC 
with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army in the DRC”.66 
Military personnel were assigned to key positions within the administration in view of 
monitoring the reform process.67 Besides, in order to extend its scope of action, the 
Council set up a mission within the existing EUSEC framework, called ‘EUSEC FIN’, 
related to the chain of payments in order to fight against corruption and to ensure 
that serving soldiers would receive their salaries on time. This part of the mission was 
reinforced in 2007 when it started to focus on the reform of the central administration 
dealing with the payroll.68  
Second, the reform of the police sector was another EU priority in the DRC in 
order to foster the transition “from a militarised society to a civilian one”69 and 
reduce the role of the army. The main aspects of the police reform were conducted, 
as for the army, by the MONUC and state agencies. In this context, the EU’s 
contribution aimed at supporting the establishment of a single Integrated Police Unit 
(IPU). The project, planned in 2003 in the framework of an inter-pillar cooperation, 
was threefold:70 through the EDF and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the 
Commission was responsible for the first two stages, consisting of ensuring “the 
rehabilitation of a training centre and the provision of basic operational equipment” 
and then providing “training to the IPU”.71 In December 2004, the Council launched 
a civilian police operation, ‘EUPOL Kinshasa’, with the aim of monitoring the IPU, and 
ensuring its respect of international standards. When this operation was terminated in 
2006, the Council decided to pursue its efforts with the launching of a new police 
operation with a broader mandate, ‘EUPOL DRC’, to support the overall police 
reform in the country and to reinforce its links with the justice sector.72   
Third, concerning the justice sector, the Commission participated in 2003 with 
other key donors in the conduct of an audit which pointed out enormous 
weaknesses hampering the judiciary to fulfil its role.73 The Commission invested large 
                                                 
66 Council of the European Union, Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP on the European Union Mission 
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resources in this sector and notably supported the establishment of a justice joint-
committee by the Ministry of Justice in 2005 in order to coordinate the donors’ 
efforts.74 Yet, no significant results have been achieved so far in this field.  
Overall, although the EU’s efforts in the field of SSR have been continuous in 
the DRC since 2003, they yielded limited results partly because of the reluctance of 
the Congolese government to undertake reforms, especially in the field of defence, 
and partly because of the EU’s internal difficulties. The small scale of the ESDP 
missions as well as delays in the implementation of their mandate highlight political 
disagreements between Member States about the level of ambition.75 For instance, 
the difficulties to fill positions within the missions, especially in ‘EUSEC DRC’ which is 
composed of only 58 personnel with 13 vacant positions,76 point out a serious lack of 
commitment. 
Besides, the EU proved for several reasons unable to live up to its ‘post-
modern’ discourse, which is based on a broad understanding of security. First, the EU 
failed to sustain an integrated approach in the DRC with different ESDP missions 
operating separately from one another. ‘EUSEC DRC’ and ‘EUPOL DRC’ had a 
common objective in reforming the army and the police and could have benefited 
from merging into one SSR mission, both in terms of visibility and efficiency. Yet, 
political disagreements discarded this option owing to the reluctance of some 
Member States to launch a new planning process for two existing missions that had 
established good practices in the field.77 Coordination was then simplified to weekly 
contacts between the Heads of Mission. Whereas the EU was repeatedly calling for a 
better Congolese intra-governmental coordination, this internal quandary somehow 
affected its own credibility.78 Second, the EU’s inter-pillar cooperation did not prove 
to be entirely successful, notably because of the absence of a joint assessment of 
needs.79 The inter-institutional rivalry was unequivocal when the Commission initially 
refused to grant a sufficient financing for ‘EUSEC DRC’ because of its reluctance to 
fund military-related activities through the Community budget.80 The ‘Athena 
mechanism’, normally used to finance military missions, even provided the mission 
with funds in the initial phase of deployment to compensate this financial gap.81 
Third, the EU did not sufficiently tackle the critical issue of democratic governance 
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over the armed forces and the respect of rule of law. The ultimate goal to restore 
‘civilian supremacy’ is difficult to reach when too little attention is devoted to the 
governance aspect of SSR. For instance, ‘EUSEC DRC’ was only composed of military 
personnel that provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Defence without real 
inputs on the issues of “democratic standards and the principles of good 
governance”82, although it was included in its mandate.83  
 
4.2  ‘EU SSR Guinea-Bissau’: a Modest Mission  
In February 2008, the EU took a new step forward in its involvement in SSR in 
Africa with the launching of ‘EU SSR Guinea-Bissau’, in a country depicted as a 
channel for drug trafficking to Europe. It is the first ESDP mission to be labelled SSR as 
such as it is an integrated mission carrying out advisory and assistance tasks 
simultaneously in the defence, police and justice sectors. It is comprised of up to 16 
advisers who are in charge of “creating the conditions for the implementation of the 
national security strategy”84 adopted in 2006 by the government.    
The fact that the mission is of an integrated nature within the second pillar 
seems to attest that the EU successfully carried out a process of lessons learnt from its 
SSR involvement in the DRC. Yet, the mandate of the mission stresses the need to 
support a reform of the ‘core security actors’ and entails a narrower understanding 
of SSR than what a holistic approach would require. As the mission should, in 
principle, last for a period of 12 months, Commission activities will then play a critical 
role to ensure the transition from short-term to longer-term objectives. The 
Commission supports SSR programmes in Guinea-Bissau through the 10th EDF, as well 
as through the Instrument for Stability by providing an expert in the justice sector.85 In 
addition, the Head of the Commission delegation is the co-Chairman of the steering 
committee on SSR. Nevertheless, if some experts of the Commission took part in the 
Fact Finding Mission of the Council for the ESDP mission, the Commission was 
relatively left aside in the planning phase, at the expense of the coordination 
between all EU instruments.86  
Besides, one cannot help noticing the modest scale of the ESDP mission in 
Guinea-Bissau, limited in personnel and in tasks to perform. Whereas the formation of 
the four integrated police units foreseen in the national security strategy would have 
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required further support, no operational activities are included in the mandate. It 
illustrates the difficulty to find a common ground between Member States in view of 
undertaking ambitious actions in Africa. In the case of ‘EU SSR Guinea-Bissau’, the 
largest common denominator between Member States was rather small.  
 
4.3  ‘Pre-modern’ Challenges to a ‘Post-modern’ EU Rationale  
The challenge of SSR in a ‘pre-modern’ state represents a prime example of 
the general difficulties inherent to the process. Interdependence of the different 
components of the security sector lies at the core of the concept but points out its 
limits since the ‘pre-modern’ condition of the state renders it more difficult to address 
all aspects of the reform. It poses the problem that the government is neither in a 
position to assess its needs and define a national security plan, nor to admit to 
national stakeholders the necessity to implement such a reform. The EU’s efforts to 
support a post-modern approach based on transparency, interdependence and 
the diffusion of power are then concomitantly constrained.   
For instance, redefining the tasks of the army to address external threats only 
was considered inappropriate by the Congolese authorities since armed forces had 
always been used to perform traditional police work. The transfer of the physical 
security tasks to the police forces was then badly perceived by the citizens, as they 
had poor records within the society because of prior acts of violence and non-
respect of human rights.87 In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the government initially 
showed strong political will to implement a security reform, as the adoption of a 
national security strategy and the creation of coordination committees illustrate.88 
Yet, the government did not manage to ensure a broad support for the reform from 
the military staff and the national plan lacked a credible outline of what the army 
would look like.89 The lingering rivalry between the President, Joao Bernardo Veira, 
and the chief of staff, General Tagme Na Waie, eventually caused violent riots in 
November 2008 and led to their assassination in March 2009. This instability put at risk 
the SSR agenda as the reform process has been left aside until a political solution is 
found to the current crisis. In the context of a ‘hard-security’ situation, the EU SSR 
mission is then left with few means to react and its tasks are reduced to almost none. 
T h e  E U ’ s  r e a c t i o n  w a s  a l m o s t  i n e x i s t e n t  a s  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  d i d  n o t  d e c i d e  t o  r e -
evaluate their engagement in this country, leaving the mission even weaker than 
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before (only Portugal politically engaged in this crisis90 while the Presidency of the EU 
merely issued a statement to condemn the events91).  
The change of attitude of the political elite of a state, from a ‘pre-modern’ to 
a ‘modern’ rhetoric, can also become an obstacle in supporting SSR, as in the case 
of the DRC.92 The large efforts of the international community to ensure that 
Presidential elections would take place contributed to stabilise the political situation 
in the DRC but it triggered a significant change in the attitude of the newly elected 
President. Whereas before the elections President Kabila was disrupted by “parallel 
command structures maintained [by former belligerents] within the army”,93 his 
election gave him more legitimacy both towards its constituencies and the 
international community. He used it as a political leverage against the donor 
community in order to delay or refuse reform plans that would hamper his room to 
manoeuvre. While political willingness of a recipient state lies at the core of the SSR 
concept, Kabila accused the donors to act like “conquistadors”.94 Hence, the 
strengthening of state institutions made Kabila sustain a ‘modern’ state attitude 
based on the reluctance to admit interference from third actors in domestic affairs. 
For instance, his lack of political willingness to effectively establish an inter-ministerial 
coordination hampered the consistency of the overall reform. He also stressed his will 
to cooperate on a bilateral basis rather than in the ‘contact group’ format.95 It 
offered a window of opportunity for the government to ‘cherry pick’ between 
assistance programmes in order to force its own agenda, that is fighting the rebel 
group led by General Nkunda, the ‘Congrès national pour la défense du peuple’, in 
the Eastern part of the DRC. 96 This approach actually put at risk the overall reform of 
the army as, when violence arose again in the Kivus in October 2008, Kabila decided 
to launch attacks with poorly trained troops and encountered successive military 
defeats. It underlines the very ‘modern’ stance sustained by Kabila since he 
favoured the military option rather than a ‘post-modern’ approach based on 
diplomatic mediation, praised by the EU, with catastrophic results.97  
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5.   The EU’s Theoretical, Institutional and Political Impediments  
 
Even though the EU has evolved towards a merging of the security and 
development concepts, its failure to live up to its ‘post-modern’ discourse is deeply 
rooted in the fragmentation of competences within the EU as well as in the residual 
cultural gap between the development and security ‘communities’.  
 
5.1  ‘Whole-of-Organisation’ Approach: a Challenge 
Sustaining a ‘whole-of-organisation’ approach would require the EU to 
overcome institutional rivalries on matters related to competences and to improve 
the coordination between short- and long-term instruments. This challenge has been 
described by Nuttall as the search for greater ‘consistency’, in particular ‘institutional 
consistency’.98 The fact that the EU does not have an overarching coordinating 
figure who would gather the different instruments under a single framework 
significantly hampers its efforts.99 In this regard, the position of High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, included in article 9 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, would solve part of the problem as he/she would assume both the positions of 
High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations. He/she would then be 
able to manage both first- and second-pillar instruments and could bring greater 
consistency to the EU’s external policies, notably in the field of SSR. 
Currently, the fact that the two institutions are not driven by the same 
dynamic renders the challenge of coordination even more complex. First, they 
function under two different decision-making procedures with rather common 
objectives but different priorities. Second, with the strengthening of the ESDP, the 
Council is still in a process of building its own legitimacy for its activities in crisis 
management in relation to other actors, including the Member States.100 Conversely, 
the Commission has had a long experience in development cooperation and does 
not encounter the same pressure for immediate results. Thus, the potential incentive 
for the Commission to coordinate better with the Council in the field of SSR is rather 
small.101  
This diverse dynamic also triggers difficulties to integrate short- and long-term 
objectives within the working culture of civilian and military personnel and limits the 
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ability of the EU to sustain a comprehensive approach. If the issue of good 
governance remains the ultimate objective of any activities in the field of SSR, the 
short-term perspective of ESDP operations hinders the allocation of substantial 
resources to that purpose, as the case of the DRC illustrated. ESDP missions are 
constrained by the need to obtain immediate results on the basis of a given 
mandate and tend to concentrate “on efficiency of the security system rather than 
on accountability”.102 On the side of the Commission, long-term instruments focus 
more on the issue of good governance but tend to be concentrated on capacity 
building “for the civil management authorities [rather] than the building of 
parliamentary, judicial and civil society institutions”.103 As summed up by an 
Commission official, “the strengthening of parliamentary bodies remains an unmet 
objective”.104  
Political and legal obstacles also limit the capacity of the EU to act on the 
whole spectrum of SSR. The mandates of ESDP civilian missions are so far limited to 
advisory tasks and cannot be extended to operational training activities. As stated 
earlier, article 28(3) TEU forbids the Community budget to finance any activities 
having defence implications, including training of units. Yet, as pointed out in the 
cases of the DRC and Guinea-Bissau, the training of newly integrated units is crucial 
for the efficiency of armed and police forces. The only alternative for Member States 
to circumvent this legal constraint would be to launch a military ESDP mission, 
financed through the ‘Athena mechanism’ and national contributions, to execute 
operational training activities.105 However, this option has never been put on the 
table and will certainly not be in the near future because of the opposition of certain 
Member States to do so and due to the high costs involved. Unlike the United Nations 
which is entitled to include training of armed forces in SSR projects through Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the scope of action of the EU is incomplete.  
 
5.2  Civil-Civil Coordination: a Conundrum 
In the search for more coherence, a striking challenge for the EU lies in its 
capacity to reach a so-called ‘civil-civil’ coordination since both the Commission 
and the Council are active in this area. The initiatives to improve inter-institutional 
coordination, politically endorsed in the Council Conclusions of November 2007 on 
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security and development,106 remain purely ad hoc though and lack a real strategic 
outlook as well as a “unified strategic command”.107 
First, following the Commission Communication on ‘Reinforcing EU Disaster 
and Crisis Response’ of 2005,108 the two institutions aspired to facilitate the sharing of 
information in early warning. Closer relations between the Monitoring Information 
Centre of the Commission and the Council Joint Situation Centre were fostered but 
no concrete mechanism has been designed.109 
Second, in the planning phase, two separate mechanisms exist with the 
Assessment and Planning Teams (APTs) of the Commission and the Crisis Response 
Teams (CRTs) of the Council. Inter-linkages between the two are increasingly 
promoted as the new practice to include Commission personnel in the Fact Finding 
Mission of the Council as well as the participation of Member State officials in the 
APTs illustrate.110  
Third, an important step forward was the creation in 2003, on an ad hoc basis, 
of the Crisis Response Coordination Teams, mainly composed of officials from the 
Council and also by officials from the Commission, in order to “promote inter-service 
coordination” and “to discuss the development of Crisis Management Concepts”.111 
In practice, it allows experts to be informed about ongoing planning activities and to 
exchange views on a specific crisis situation.  
Fourth, the Commission appointed a single SSR focal point within DG Relex in 
order to obtain a horizontal overview over SSR activities and facilitate contacts with 
other actors, including the Council. The services of the General Secretariat of the 
Council are expected to do the same in the near future to respond to the growing 
importance of SSR in the EU’s external policies.112   
As a result, efforts to improve civil-civil coordination are ongoing but they 
embody temporary solutions for permanent problems, especially in the field of 
delimitation of competences. For instance, the following ‘grey areas’ are sources of 
overlap and ‘competition’ between the first and second pillars: border 
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management, actions in support of the rule of law or control of SALW.113 In this 
regard, the ‘ECOWAS case’, issued by the European Court of Justice in May 2008,114 
addresses the question of shared competences. Its concrete consequences need to 
be closely examined in order to determine its actual impact on the EU’s contribution 
to SSR, especially in the field of rule of law.  
 
5.3  Civil-Military Cooperation: a Practical Struggle  
Whereas civil-military relations are at the core of its strategic culture, the EU still 
encounters problems to ensure an effective civil-military cooperation. For ESDP 
missions in the field of SSR, there is no pre-determined chain of command. For 
instance, while ‘EUSEC DRC’ was legally speaking listed as a civilian mission, the 
personnel of the mission was entirely composed of military. In addition, the planning 
documents were prepared by the unit of the General Secretariat of the Council in 
charge of military aspects (DGE8) and discussed in the political-military group. The 
coordination with the committee for civilian aspects of crisis management was rather 
scarce, despite the fact that other SSR-related missions in the DRC, ‘EUPOL Kinshasa’ 
and ‘EUPOL DRC’, were discussed in this group. 
Interestingly, the EU SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau, which integrates for the first 
time both civilian and military aspects of SSR, functions with a civilian chain of 
command as the CPCC planned (in coordination with the military staff) and 
conducts the mission. Yet, one can wonder whether the CPCC would genuinely be 
able to deal with the defence aspects of the mission. The fact that the Civ-Mil Cell 
has only been consulted in the planning process, but is not the key structure in a 
purely civilian-military mission is a political signal. It might be viewed as a way to 
promote the ‘civilianisation of ESDP’ rather than to support a civil-military culture, as 
certain Member States might oppose it.  
Moreover, the civil-military nature of SSR renders the pooling of resources more 
difficult since it requires the mobilisation of human resources from different working 
cultures.115 Whereas SSR has been identified as a high priority on the agenda, the EU 
suffers from a shortage of experts in this field for three main reasons: first, due to the 
relative novelty of the concept; second, because the concept itself requires civil-
military alertness; third, because of the Member States’ inclination to retain SSR 
                                                 
113 See S. Duke, ‘Areas of Grey: Tensions in EU External Relations Competences’, Eipascope, 
No. 1, 2006, p. 21. 
114 European Court of Justice, Case C-91/05, ‘European Commission against the Council of 
the European Union’, 20 May 2008. 
115 P.  Serrano, ‘A Strategic Approach to the ESDP’, in Nowak (ed.), op.cit., p. 48. 
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experts rather than to allocate them to the EU owing to their scarcity.116 To live up to 
its commitment in SSR, the EU needs to make efforts in order to facilitate the 
identification and the formation of SSR experts. In this regard, the decision taken in 
November 2008 to create a pool of experts in the field of SSR that could support 
ESDP or Community activities represents an important step forward to professionalise 
the EU’s contribution to SSR.117 
 
5.4  Political Willingness of the Member States: a Necessity 
The fact that ESDP missions are launched within the second pillar, where 
unanimity is the rule, requires a strong political support from the Member States, both 
on the scope of the mandate and on the human resources granted to the mission.118 
However, national interests or priorities tend to diverge and, in the end, limit the EU’s 
contribution to SSR in Africa. Indeed, some Member States have always shown 
readiness to get further involved in Africa due to their historical ties, whereas others 
are reluctant to do so and/or prioritise actions in the near neighbourhood of the 
EU.119 In this context, while launching an ESDP mission is always politically sensitive, it is 
even more so in Africa as certain Member States are ‘accused’ of forcing their own 
agenda. Furthermore, the small size of the CFSP budget120 impedes the proliferation 
of civilian ESDP missions and narrows the degree of flexibility of Member States to 
accept the launching of a mission in a region not considered as a priority area. The 
fact that the initial work on a possible mission in Guinea-Bissau took place under the 
Portuguese Presidency of the EU highlights the political impact of a single Member 
State when it holds the Presidency. In this very case, the limited scope and small size 
of the mission reflects the political bargain between Member States that strongly 
supported the launching of the mission and others that did not consider it as a 
priority. As a result, the EU launched an extremely small mission, composed of 15 
international personnel coming from five Member States, of which 60% are 
Portuguese.121 Hence, if it is difficult to measure the mission’s effectiveness, the 
chances of success are relatively limited, as the current situation in the country 
                                                 
116 Interview with an official of the GSC.  
117 Council of the European Union, ‘Conclusions on ESDP’, Brussels, 10 November 2008.  
118 The EUMM Georgia mission, launched in September 2008 after the conflict between 
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launch a mission and the resources granted to it. Indeed, the force generation process has 
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119 N. Pauwels, op.cit., p. 2. 
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period 2007-2013, €1980 million were allocated to the CFSP budget, about €280 million per 
year.  
121 Statistics provided by an official of the GSC, March 2009. 
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shows. Political support from the Member States, comprising both the approval of an 
ambitious mandate and the allocation of personnel to implement it, is then an 
indispensable driving force to operationalise the SSR concept in Africa as the 
legitimacy and credibility of ESDP missions rest upon their capacity to deliver results in 
the short term.    
 
6. Conclusions 
"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate 
to the stormy present. As our case is new 
so we must think anew and act anew.” 
Abraham Lincoln 
Message to Congress, 1 December 1862. 
 
SSR has been identified as a new concept at the crossroads of the security 
and development nexus and civil-military relations. Its broad nature is both an asset 
and a shortcoming since it widens the reform prospects but complicates the 
definition of a strategic plan and the pooling of resources. The EU rapidly erected this 
concept as one of its external policy priorities and is making use of the wide array of 
policy instruments at its disposal to support its implementation in Africa. Compared to 
other organisations or states, the EU genuinely has a comparative advantage in the 
field of SSR as, on the one hand, its policy instruments cover the whole spectrum of 
SSR and combine short-term and long-term instruments and, on the other hand, its 
‘post-modern’ rationale allows it to overcome traditional state bilateral relations. In 
this regard, the incorporation of SSR-related activities in the scope of the ‘Petersberg 
tasks’ in the Lisbon Treaty illustrates the assimilation of the concept by the EU.  
Although the EU definitely has the money, the resources and possibly the 
legitimacy, it is still a laggard that lacks greater consistency and stronger political 
support. The absence of a common EU strategy for SSR underlines, first, the 
fragmentation of competences within the EU and, second, the residual cultural gap 
between a development-oriented and a security-oriented community. The EU 
actually needs to evolve from a sub-sector to a more comprehensive approach by 
developing a strategic culture at the crossroads of security and governance, with an 
aggregation of its short- and long-term instruments.122 While the immediate provision 
of security would not foster good governance, the sole focus on good governance 
would limit the prospects for stabilisation. As the Council provides rapid assistance in 
the short-term through its ESDP missions, one can expect the Community to 
                                                 
122 I. Buxton ‘The European Community Perspective on SSR’, in Spence & Fluri, op.cit., p. 31. 
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complement these efforts by providing assistance in the long run. At the same time, 
Member States also need to offer political and strategic support to Commission 
activities so as to sponsor a ‘whole-of-organisation’ approach. Thus, the challenge 
for the EU is to be able to bridge a gap that does not exist for nation states. The 
measures included in the Lisbon Treaty, if ever ratified, could contribute to unravel 
this inter-institutional rivalry by gathering all EU instruments under the authority of the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The final aim of the EU’s approach in SSR is to promote ‘human security’ as a 
corollary of ‘state security’ through a ‘post-modern rationale’. There are structural 
limits in the implementation of this logic in Africa. The case of the DRC pointed out 
the potential obstacles emerging from assisting a ‘pre-modern’ state to become a 
‘modern state’, while the case of Guinea-Bissau demonstrated the difficulties to 
deliver an SSR agenda when political instability remains. Compared to its SSR 
activities in Eastern Europe, which are part of a broader integrationist process, the EU 
faces the complex challenge of political reluctance and instability. Even though the 
EU has the ‘carrot’, it does not have the ‘stick’ to make sure that reforms will actually 
be enforced. The implementation of SSR in Africa therefore needs a stronger political 
support from Member States to uphold stabilisation processes and perhaps a higher 
degree of conditionality from the Commission to benefit from its development 
programmes in order to avoid attitudes of free-riding of recipient states.  
In the words of Lincoln, “as our case is new so we must think anew and act 
anew”, the EU could find inspiration for its future activities in the field of SSR. The 
novelty of the concept and the EU’s short experience in the field of crisis 
management make the EU SSR policy still an embryonic aspect of its external 
actions. SSR can be present everywhere and nowhere. At the moment, it is closer to 
nowhere in the sense that it still lacks a ‘new strategic outlook’ for a ‘new approach’ 
which would allow the EU to ‘act anew’.  
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